Structured Occurrence Nets: Incomplete, contradictory and uncertain failure evidence by Randell B & Koutny M
  
COMPUTING 
SCIENCE 
Structured Occurrence Nets: Incomplete, contradictory and 
uncertain failure evidence 
 
 
Brian Randell and Maciej Koutny 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES 
 
No. CS-TR-1170 September 2009 
TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES 
              
 
No. CS-TR-1170  September, 2009 
 
 
 
Structured Occurrence Nets:  Incomplete, contradictory and 
uncertain failure evidence 
 
 
B. Randell and M. Koutny 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Occurrence Nets (ONs) are directed acyclic graphs that represent causality and 
concurrency information concerning a single execution of a system. Structured 
Occurrence Nets (SONs), consist of multiple ONs associated together by means of 
various types of formal relationship, and are intended for recording information about 
either (i) the actual or envisaged behaviour of complex systems, as they interact and 
evolve, or (ii) evidence that is being gathered and analysed concerning the past 
behaviour of complex evolving systems.  The present report is intended as an addition 
to our prior work, focussed on the problem of supporting the analysis of evidence 
about the activities of complex (hardware, software and human) systems that were 
involved in cybercrime, or are implicated in major accidents, situations in which all 
that is likely to be to hand is incomplete, contradictory and uncertain evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2009 University of Newcastle upon Tyne. 
Printed and published by the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 
Computing Science, Claremont Tower, Claremont Road, 
Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, England. 
Bibliographical details 
 
RANDELL, B., KOUTNY, M.. 
 
Structured Occurrence Nets:  Incomplete, contradictory and uncertain failure evidence 
[By] B. Randell, M. Koutny 
 
Newcastle upon Tyne: University of Newcastle upon Tyne: Computing Science, 2009. 
 
(University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Computing Science, Technical Report Series, No. CS-TR-1170) 
 
Added entries 
 
UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE 
Computing Science. Technical Report Series.  CS-TR-1170 
 
Abstract 
 
Occurrence Nets (ONs) are directed acyclic graphs that represent causality and concurrency information 
concerning a single execution of a system. Structured Occurrence Nets (SONs), consist of multiple ONs associated 
together by means of various types of formal relationship, and are intended for recording information about either 
(i) the actual or envisaged behaviour of complex systems, as they interact and evolve, or (ii) evidence that is being 
gathered and analysed concerning the past behaviour of complex evolving systems.  The present report is intended 
as an addition to our prior work, focussed on the problem of supporting the analysis of evidence about the 
activities of complex (hardware, software and human) systems that were involved in cybercrime, or are implicated 
in major accidents, situations in which all that is likely to be to hand is incomplete, contradictory and uncertain 
evidence. 
 
About the author 
 
Brian Randell graduated in Mathematics from Imperial College, London in 1957 and joined the English Electric 
Company where he led a team that implemented a number of compilers, including the Whetstone KDF9 Algol 
compiler.  From 1964 to 1969 he was with IBM in the United States, mainly at the IBM T.J. Watson Research 
Center, working on operating systems, the design of ultra-high speed computers and computing system design 
methodology.  He then became Professor of Computing Science at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, where 
in 1971 he set up the project that initiated research into the possibility of software fault tolerance, and introduced 
the "recovery block" concept.  Subsequent major developments included the Newcastle Connection, and the 
prototype Distributed Secure System.  He has been Principal Investigator on a succession of research projects in 
reliability and security funded by the Science Research Council (now Engineering and Physical Sciences Research 
Council), the Ministry of Defence, and the European Strategic Programme of Research in Information Technology 
(ESPRIT), and now the European Information Society Technologies (IST) Programme.  Most recently he has had 
the role of Project Director of CaberNet (the IST Network of Excellence on Distributed Computing Systems 
Architectures), and of two IST Research Projects, MAFTIA (Malicious- and Accidental-Fault Tolerance for 
Internet Applications) and DSoS (Dependable Systems of Systems).  He has published nearly two hundred 
technical papers and reports, and is co-author or editor of seven books. He is now Emeritus Professor of 
Computing Science, and Senior Research Investigator, at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne. 
 
Maciej Koutny is a Professor of Computing Science in the School of Computing Science at Newcastle University. 
He received his MSc (1982) and PhD (1984) in Applied Mathematics from the Warsaw University of Technology, 
Poland. In 1985 he joined the then Computing Laboratory of the University of Newcastle upon Tyne to work as a 
Research Associate. In 1986 he became a Lecturer in Computing Science at Newcastle, and from 1994 to 2000 he 
held an established Readership at Newcastle University.  His research interests centre on the theory of distributed 
and concurrent systems, including both theoretical aspects of their semantics and application of formal techniques 
to the modelling and verification of such systems; in particular, model checking based on net unfoldings. He has 
also investigated non-interleaving semantics of priority systems, and the relationship between temporal logic and 
process algebras. Recently, he has been working on the development of a formal model combining Petri nets and 
process algebras as well as on Petri net based behavioural models of membrane systems.  He is a member of the 
Steering Committee of the International Conferences on Application and Theory of Petri Nets and Other Models 
of Concurrency(http://www.daimi.au.dk/PetriNets/), and a member of the IFIP Working Group 2.2 on Description 
of Programming Concepts. He serves as an editor of the LNCS Transactions on Petri Nets and Other Models of 
Concurrency (ToPNoC), and the Scientific Annals of Computer Science journal. He has been a Visiting Professor 
at Xidian University, China, University of Evry, France, and University Paris 12, France.  His Programme 
Committee chairmanship includes: ICATPN'01, ACSD'08 and CHINA'08.  He is the scientific co-director of the 
5th Advanced Course on Petri Nets to be held in 2010.  
 
 
Suggested keywords 
 
FAILURES  
ERRORS  
FAULTS 
DEPENDABILITY 
JUDGEMENT 
OCCURRENCE NETS 
ABSTRACTION 
FORMAL ANALYSIS 
Structured Occurrence Nets:
Incomplete, contradictory and uncertain
failure evidence
Brian Randell and Maciej Koutny
School of Computing Science
Newcastle University
Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU
United Kingdom
{brian.randell,maciej.koutny}@ncl.ac.uk
Abstract. Occurrence Nets (ONs) are directed acyclic graphs that represent cau-
sality and concurrency information concerning a single execution of a system.
Structured Occurrence Nets (SONs) [22, 32], consist of multiple ONs associated
together by means of various types of formal relationship, and are intended for
recording information about either (i) the actual or envisaged behaviour of com-
plex systems, as they interact and evolve, or (ii) evidence that is being gathered
and analysed concerning the past behaviour of complex evolving systems. The
present report is intended as an addition to [32], focussed on the problem of sup-
porting the analysis of evidence about the activities of complex (hardware, soft-
ware and human) systems that were involved in cybercrime, or are implicated in
major accidents, situations in which all that is likely to be to hand is incomplete,
contradictory and uncertain evidence.
Keywords: failures, errors, faults, dependability, judgement, occurrence nets, ab-
straction, formal analysis.
1 Introduction
The concept of a ‘structured occurrence net’ (SON), which as its name
implies is based on that of an ‘occurrence net’, was introduced in [32]
and described in more detail in [22]. Occurrence Nets (ONs) are directed
acyclic graphs that represent causality and concurrency information con-
cerning a single execution of a system. SONs consist of multiple ONs
associated together by means of various types of formal relationship, and
are intended for recording information about either (i) the actual or en-
visaged behaviour of complex systems, as they interact and evolve, or
(ii) evidence that is being gathered and analysed concerning the past be-
haviour of complex evolving systems. One particular possible applica-
tion of SONs, the focus of the present paper, is support for the analysis
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of evidence about the activities of complex (hardware, software and hu-
man) systems that are involved in cybercrime, or are implicated in major
accidents.
Condition (place) Event (transition)
Past condition Extant condition
Interaction
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
c6e1
e2
e4
e3
Fig. 1. Basic notation (top) and an occurrence net (bottom). We adopt the graphical convention
that, in order to distinguish them from ordinary occurrence nets, structured occurrence nets which
contain two or more component occurrence nets are shown surrounded by a solid line bounding
box.
ONs can portray the (alleged) past and present state of affairs, in
terms of places (conditions, represented by circles), transitions (events,
represented by squares) and arrows (each from a place to a transition,
or from a transition to a place, representing (alleged) causality) — see
the notation shown in Figure 1. (This figure, and a number of others
used in the present paper, come from [22].) The ON formalism is well-
established and used extensively, and is well-supported by tools for sys-
tem validation and synthesis [6, 14–18]. For simple nets, an actual graph-
ical representation suffices. However, in the case of complex nets, these
are better represented in some linguistic or tabular form. ONs could be
‘generated’ by executing Petri nets representing computing systems, but
they can in fact be used to record the execution of any (potentially asyn-
chronous) process — carried out by computer systems and/or humans—
no matter what notation or language might be used to define it. In fact,
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various other graphical notations similar to ONs can be found in both the
hardware and the software design worlds, e.g., strand spaces [35], signal
diagrams [24] and message sequence charts [27].
Our original interest in what we now term SONs arose out of a wish to
gain greater understanding of basic dependability concepts, and in par-
ticular of ‘fault-error-failure chains’ in evolving complex systems, and
the notion of ‘failure judgements’. Now, however, our main motivation
for defining and exploring the formal properties of SONs is our belief
that, due to their structuring, SONs can be used to achieve a significant
reduction of the cognitive and computational difficulties that arise in us-
ing ONs for modelling and analysing the behaviour of complex evolving
systems. (In fact SONs provide yet another case of the ‘divide and con-
quer’ approach to complexity reduction, and thus should help to limit
state space explosion in analysis tools.)
In [22] we discussed how automatically-generated fully-detailed SONs
(produced either from actual systems, or from models of intended sys-
tems), could be used to extend the capabilities of (i) existing ON-based
model-checking approaches to system validation [14, 31], and (ii) exist-
ing tools for the automated synthesis of systems (e.g., VLSI designs)
from exemplar ONs [15]. However, we also discussed the use of SONs
that had been created after the fact from whatever evidence of a system’s
actions was available to assist the task of analysing (accidental or mali-
cious) failures in large complex evolving systems.
A possibility that we find particularly interesting is that of using such
SONs to facilitate the analysis of failures in systems involving software,
hardware and people. For example, this could be in order in order to
identify those responsible for a complex (cyber)crime, or to determine
the causes(s) of a major accident, situations in which all that is likely to
be to hand is incomplete, contradictory and uncertain evidence. It is the
problem of support for such analysis tasks that the present paper concen-
trates on.
In the appendix we outline a formalisation of some of the notions
described in the main body of this paper.
2 Relations between ONs
In [22] we defined two classes of relations between ONs, namely ordered
relations (abstraction and behaviour), and unordered relations (system
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interaction, retention and judgement). Abstraction, which has two basic
forms (spatial and temporal), provides means of abbreviating/condensing
a perhaps very large ON. In its simplest form spatial abstraction in-
volves identifying a subgraph consisting of a set of conditions (that are
not causally linked within this subgraph but instead are potentially co-
existing) in an ON, and representing this subgraph by a single condi-
tion in a more abstract ON. Similarly basic temporal abstraction involves
identifying a subgraph consisting of a set of events (and any intervening
conditions) that are causally linked within this subgraph in an ON, and
relating this to a single event in a more abstract ON. In general, however,
abstraction involves elements of both spatial and temporal abstraction.
Figure 2 shows some of the spatial (s) and temporal (t) relations in-
volved in an example in which the activities of two systems, represented
by ONs with differently-shaded conditions and events, have been in part
abbreviated and in part merged into a single activity. This single abstract
activity thus hides the intercommunication that is shown as taking place
between the original two activities. (Temporal abstraction is in general
somewhat tricky because of the fundamental requirement— arising from
the intention of representing causality — that all ONs must be acyclic.
Such problems of temporal abstraction, which are dealt with in Section 5
of [22], are not discussed further here.)
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
ts
ts
ts
ts
ts
ts
Fig. 2. Combined spatial and temporal abstraction — the ‘spatially abstracts’ and ‘temporally ab-
stracts’ correspondences are indicated by groups of s-labelled and t-labelled edges, respectively.
The behaviour relation is one that we introduced in [32] as a result
of our belated realisation that the concepts of ‘system’ and ‘state’ are not
separate, but just a question of viewpoint, so that (different related) ONs
can represent a system and its states using the same symbol — a ‘place’.
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Specifically, a connected subgraph comprised just of states and events
of a given system is explicitly related to a single state of a higher level
activity, an activity which is portraying this given system’s existence, for
example recording its creation, continued existence and termination.
This type of relation is of importance in situations where systems
evolve, or suffer modifications, in ways that could affect their behaviour,
as it allows the behaviour of a system to be related to that of (particular
states of) the evolving system itself. (See the SON portrayed in Figure 3,
which shows, in its upper level, the history of two systems, each of which
suffers a modification, and in its lower level ONs representing the activ-
ities that the initial unmodified, and subsequently the modified, versions
of these systems give rise to. Note that the same shading is used for the
higher and the lower level view of each system.)
b b
b b
b b b
b b b
Fig. 3. The behaviour of a pair of systems, while they each suffer one modification.
Being ordered relations, the abstraction and behaviour relations must
not result in any cycles — one cannot for example use spatial abstraction
to model a system containing itself as a component! (This acyclicity re-
quirement is additional to that concerning causality.) On the other hand,
such acyclicity restrictions do not apply to the other relations between
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ONs that are defined in [22], namely system interaction, retention and
judgement, since they are in general unordered.
Two forms of system interaction relation are defined — causal and
synchronous — that relate events of distinct ONs (i.e., the activities of
separate systems). The former relation means that an event in one ON is
a causal predecessor of another event in another ON (information flow
was unidirectional), while the latter means that two events have been
executed synchronously (information flow was bidirectional). Such sys-
tem interaction relations are represented by thick dashed arcs in the SON
shown in Figure 4. (These thick dashed arcs and edges are abstractions
of the details that represent such system interactions when one describes
such a compound system by a single large unstructured ON.)
Fig. 4. Causal and asynchronous system interaction.
The retention relation arises as a result of one system storing (via a
retain operation) information (regarding conditions, events and/or links)
that is, or purports to be, information about the activity of another sys-
tem. (Such information will be held until an appropriate discard opera-
tion takes place.) One possible reason for retaining such data is to pro-
vide means of error recovery and back-up to this other system. However,
here we concentrate on issues related to data that has been retained (or
perhaps generated or supplemented by inference and guesswork) as po-
tential evidence for purposes of post-hoc failure analysis. For example,
and illustrating the unordered nature of the retention relation, a cyber-
crime scenario might be modelled as involving several systems (e.g., an
investigative agency and two rival crime syndicates), each of which is,
amongst its other activities, attempting to obtain, retain and exploit in-
formation about the activities of the other two systems in order to disrupt
them.
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We view such failure analysis as being performed by a system that is
acting as a judgment system, such as a judge in charge of a fatal accident
enquiry, or the detective team conducting a major criminal investigation.
(In other situations the judgements might, for example, be made by (i)
a technician equipped with an authoritative system specification, or even
(ii) a fully-automated checking facility.) Figure 5 from [22] illustrates
a simple example of such a situation by showing (a) some fragmentary
evidence, and (b) the judgement activity that obtained and retained this
fragmentary evidence, together with the unknown, and perhaps unknow-
able, actual SON that gave rise to this evidence.
(a)
(b)
e
r
r r j
r
r r
r
r
r d
r
Fig. 5. An evidence, in the form of SON fragments (a); and the judgement SON from which the
retained evidence could have been obtained (b).
The judgement relation arises as a result of an act of judgement,
which typically will involve an interaction between the judgement sys-
tem and the system being judged, so that the future course of action of the
latter can be appropriately affected (e.g., release or imprisonment, in the
case of legal judgements). By regarding failures simply as events that are
identified as such by judgement systems, we can allow for the fact that (i)
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depending on the viewpoint adopted, the same behaviour may or may not
be regarded as a failure, and that (ii) failure judgements may themselves
turn out to be judged later by some further system to have been incorrect
— a situation that is allowed for in the legal world with its hierarchy of
courts, the lower levels of which might have their judgements overturned
by higher courts. Similarly, by regarding data retention as an act per-
formed by a system (perhaps as part of an investigative process), one can
allow for the possibility that such a data retention system could fail (in
the eyes of some judgement system) by, for example, losing or interfering
with evidence. Thus such concepts as ‘chain of custody’ and ‘provenance
of evidence’, and their related problems, can readily be modelled.
As we have illustrated, unlike the detailed SONs that are created from
system models, e.g., as part of a model-checking exercise, any such re-
tained SON is very likely to be fragmentary. It nevertheless has to be
consistent with the various theorems that are stated and proved in [22],
e.g., regarding acyclicity, a fact that could and should be exploited by the
experimental tool that we hope to build for supporting the storage, ma-
nipulation and analysis of SONs. (Such a SON tool is likely to be based
on existing tools for ONs [31].) In particular, the tool should be able not
just to enforce acyclicity, but also to assist by drawing attention to, and
facilitating the filling in of, gaps between SON fragments.
Such a tool is best regarded as constituting a somewhat general in-
frastructure (in fact essentially a form of database management system),
which could support system evaluation using complete SONs, system
synthesis from exemplar SONs, or failure analysis of possibly fragmen-
tary SONs, via appropriate specialised applications. (The applications
would typically make use of additional information — in effect annota-
tions of places, links, conditions and/or relations - held in a given SON
database.) The infrastructure tool would embody fairly general facilities
for assessing and reporting on the completeness and consistency of a
database representing a given SON, using algorithms based on the var-
ious theorems and propositions given in [22]. But the task of creating
the representation of the SON and of performing specialised analyses
and manipulations of it would be the responsibility of such specialised
applications, using infrastructure-provided facilities for:
– visualising ONs;
– creating new (empty) ONs,
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– adding or deleting single events, or conditions (with their links);
– maintaining and providing access to event, condition, link, and rela-
tion annotations;
– establishing and destroying relations between ONs; and
– destroying complete ONs (provided they are not related to any other
occurrence nets).
Validating such a database (w.r.t. the rules concerning well-formedness
of sets of related ONs) might be done incrementally, as data is added,
so that the database is always (syntactically) valid, or could be a pro-
cess that is done occasionally, and followed by attempts at resolving
any detected errors. There would of course also be a need to validate
the semantics of the database, taking into account all annotations —
an application-specific task that could be aided by appropriate visuali-
sation tools. The result could we believe provide useful support for the
‘knowledge-based’ modelling technique that has been developed for for-
mulating plausible scenarios worthy of further police investigation [13]
or the ‘Why-Because’ causal analysis scheme designed for aircraft acci-
dent analyses [23] and also used for security incident analyses [34].
However to provide really useful infrastructure support for applica-
tions related to very complex accident and criminal investigations, we
believe that it is necessary to extend the SON concept. This would be
in order to provide explicit support for the representation and analysis of
contradictory and uncertain, as opposed to merely fragmentary, evidence.
These issues are the subject of the following main sections of this paper.
3 Contradictory Evidence
There is an already-existing extension to the basic ON notation, namely
the ‘barb’ [20], used for an event that could have occurred, given the
condition(s) that existed, but which did not — see Figure 6, where barbs
are represented by a box containing a circle. In some cases such barbs
will have required the coincident existence of several conditions.
We now further extend the ON notation, by building on the barb con-
cept, so as to allow the simultaneous modelling of multiple alternative
scenarios that could have occurred in particular states, when there is
insufficient evidence to indicate which particular scenario actually oc-
curred. This is illustrated in Figure 7, which uses letters A and B to dis-
tinguish between two alternative system activities. Specifically, it shows
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Fig. 6. Events that could have occurred — but didn’t.
that two alternative ways in which the given system’s final state might
have come about have been envisaged and are being represented in a sin-
gle ON. (This ON can be regarded as a combination of the two alternative
ONs.)
A
B
A
A
A
B
A
B
A A
B
A
B
A
B
Fig. 7. Two alternative scenarios.
Note that such alternative activities are indicated by multiple causal
links emanating from a condition, in contrast to parallel activity, whose
initiation is marked by multiple causal links emanating from an event
(see Figure 1). Evidently, alternative chains of activity within a single
ON represent happenings in what are in effect different ‘worlds’, and
it would not make sense to have any interactions between such worlds.
Figure 8 shows examples of possible causal links: ones that are allowed
between parallel activities from potentially the same world, and ones that
are disallowed between the alternative (A and B) worlds. (An infrastruc-
ture tool supporting SONs could and should police these rules, which
are somewhat reminiscent of those concerning atomicity in transaction
processing.)
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B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
⋆
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
√
Fig. 8. Examples of allowed (
√
) and disallowed (⋆) causal links.
There is also the very real possibility of contradictory or inadequate
evidence concerning relations between ONs, so motivating the incorpo-
ration of multiple alternative relations within a single SON, and therefore
in some cases there being multiple alternative ONs. Figure 9(a) shows an
ON representing the activities of three systems, in which there are al-
ternative causal links from the middle activity to either the upper or the
lower activity. The pair of alternative events lead on not only to links to
other activities, but also to links that, through coming back to a single
condition, show that no matter which alternative is chosen, the middle
activity continues in its own right. (As in the previous figure, letters are
used to distinguish alternative consequences.) Figure 9(b) is an equiv-
alent SON, in which the three activities are simply regarded as three
separate ONs and some of their parts have been subjected to temporal
abstraction, the details of whose interactions are hidden, being instead
represented by (alternative) system interaction relations — the fact that
these relations are alternatives is again implied by the letter markings.
There may also, for example, be contradictory or inadequate evidence
linking systems to their behaviours, leading to the inclusion of alternative
behaviour relations in a SON. Figure 10(a) shows behaviour that has been
identified as either that of systemA or that of systemB (which underwent
a modification during this period); Figure 10(b) shows that two alternate
behaviours (A and B) have been ascribed to a given system, over a period
when it suffered a modification.
Similarly, particularly when there has been inadequate attention paid
to the problem of the evidential ‘chain of custody’, one might have a sit-
uation in which there are differing rival sets of evidence about a given ac-
tivity, and hence a need to incorporate alternative retention relations. Re-
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(a)
A A
B B
A A
B B
A
B
A
B
A
B
B B
A A
(b)
A
B
A
B
Fig. 9. Alternative interactions, in an ON (a), and in an equivalent SON (b).
garding spatial and/or temporal abstraction relations in general, multiple
alternative abstractions of the same ON could also sometimes be useful,
and so could give rise to contradictory (abstract) accounts of what actu-
ally happened — for example different judges may take differing views,
i.e., construct different abstractions of, the same evidence. (The opposite
also holds: two or more differing models of a given activity might have a
single common abstraction.)
4 Uncertain Evidence
As we have indicated, during post hoc inquiries the full details of the
activity of an actual complex system under investigation will almost cer-
tainly not be known — all that will be available is the evidence that has
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(a)
A B BB
b b b bb
b b b b
(b)
B B B B
A A A AA A
B B B
b b b
b
b b
b b b
Fig. 10. Alternative behaviour relations.
been obtained (or surmised) by this activity’s judges, i.e., in all probabil-
ity just a fragmentary set of inaccurate and perhaps contradictory ONs.
Turning these into a plausible more ‘complete’ (i.e., connected and self-
consistent) SON will involve adding events, conditions, links and rela-
tions (based either on evidence or guesswork). Moreover, as we indicated
above, it might well also be wished to include various sets of alternative
behaviours within the SON, at least until it is decided what actually hap-
pened so that all but one of each set of alternative behaviours can be
discarded. (One could go further and also introduce and use a further
type of relation ‘provides evidence for the existence of’ — between an
element of a SON and an extant state of another SON that documents this
evidence and which is buttressed by ‘chain of custody’ activity recording
the provenance of this evidence.)
It would be useful therefore to be able to annotate particular events,
conditions, links and relations with some form of probability estimate
— indicating the current degree of certainty a judge has about the accu-
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racy of their representation. It is therefore attractive to provide means by
which a modeller can specify estimates of the relative likelihood of the
different alternatives that are modelled, in fact by associating probabili-
ties with the links or interaction relations leading to the starting events of
alternatives. These means could be very simple, e.g., numerical probabil-
ity estimates, on say a five point scale, or actual probability distributions
and their parameters.
Once such probability estimates have provided for each such starting
link or relation, then an infrastructure tool could readily calculate esti-
mates for all uncertain events, conditions, links and relations. However
any events, conditions, links and relations that are not within any of the
separate worlds that have been ‘created’ by alternative links or interac-
tion relations will be regarded as certain events, for which no probability
estimate need be recorded. This is illustrated in Figure 11, in which cal-
culated (as opposed to assigned) estimates of link probabilities are shown
in italics. (As before states and events within alternative activities are
given distinguishing labels.)
A
B
A1
A2
A
B
A
A1
A2
A1
A2
B
A
0.6
0.6
0.5 (0.3)
0.3 0.3
0.3
0.6
0.6
0.4
0.4 0.4
0.4
0.5 (0.3)
0.3 0.3
0.3
Fig. 11. Uncertainty annotations.
Figure 12 shows such annotations augmenting the SON that was
shown in Figure 9(b).
There could of course be multiple judges who, even if they agree on
the modelling of complex activity, might have different estimates of the
relative probabilities of any alternative sub-activities involved. Thus there
would be merit in associating sets of probability estimate annotations
with particular judges.
It is worth pointing out that concepts essentially equivalent to the
above notions of associating probability estimates and evidential infor-
mation with particular linked events, and of providing alternative event
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A
B
A
B
0.7
0.3
0.7
0.3
Fig. 12. Uncertainty annotations for alternative interaction relations.
sequences, are in fact already supported in some lineage-linked database
systems (systems used by genealogists to record and analyse family trees)
such as [10, 36]. (Family trees are by no means always actual trees be-
cause of events such as intermarriage between cousins; they are in fact
acyclic directed graphs, and could readily be represented as ONs.) The
more advanced lineage-linked database systems provide also facilities for
such tasks as merging incomplete inaccurate family trees or sections of
family trees, and for performing various types of validity check (though
they do not provide anything comparable to the structuring facilities we
have defined based on inter-ON relations).
For example, one important attribute of events in lineage-linked data-
bases is that of ‘date of occurrence’ (e.g., of births, marriages and deaths).
When this attribute is recorded for a reasonable fraction of the events in
the database, then it is possible to calculate useful date ranges for any un-
dated events, and to provide some useful automated consistency check-
ing [5]. This can lead to the identification of inaccurate date attributes, or
to questioning the accuracy of one or more links in the database. Support
for the storing and analysis of such temporal attributes would seem to be
an appropriate facility also for structured ONs being used for conjectural
failure analysis.
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5 Conclusions
To the best of our knowledge the basic ideas that we described in [32]
and [22] for structuring occurrence nets are novel, and we have some con-
fidence that they could facilitate the production of significantly-improved
tools for modelling and analysing complex software and hardware sys-
tems, a topic with which we are rather familiar. However we have here
attempted to identify an appropriate set of extensions to the basic SON
concepts aimed at providing reasonably general means of representing a
large body of incomplete, contradictory and uncertain records of com-
plex activities. As indicated the type of activities we particularly have in
mind involve hardware, software and humans, and give rise to volumi-
nous detailed records that have to be investigated after various kinds of
system failure (due to either accidental or malicious faults).
Our knowledge of this area is second-hand— but we have studied the
survey of the numerous existing modelling notations for activity analy-
ses and event reconstruction, for example, see [12], as well as the several
accounts of particular investigation techniques referenced earlier [13, 23,
34]. We note the cautionary comments in, for example, [25, 26] about the
limitations of activity (or ‘incident’) analysis on its own as a technique of
accident investigation and prevention, and accept the necessity for sys-
tem analyses (e.g., concerning a system’s safety control structures) as
well as activity analyses in this arena at least. However, it seems clear
that in very complex failure situations activity analysis is likely to re-
main an important and challenging task; it is our belief that our formally-
defined concept of Structured Occurrence Nets has significant potential
advantages over the various other notations currently in use in support
of such analyses, especially in situations in which very large amounts of
evidence have to be recorded and analysed (e.g., in major accident and
crime investigations).
Our belief is in part due to the various SON relations we define and
discuss in [22], in part to the scheme we describe above for showing
contradictory (alternative) activities and relations within a SON. This
scheme is aimed at both ease of use and of (automated) consistency and
(syntactic) validity checking. These aims have motivated the method we
propose for associating explicit indications of any uncertainties about a
SON’s accuracy to a structured scheme of alternative activities and rela-
tions.
Structured Occurrence Nets: Incomplete, contradictory and uncertain failure evidence 17
However, it is evident that the practical usability of this scheme in,
and indeed the applicability of the basic SON concept to, post hoc inves-
tigations of complex accidents or crimes is dependent on the provision
of adequate tool support. Thus we regard our work to date on SONs as
just a starting point for the development of an infrastructure tool (per-
haps incorporating existing occurrence net tools). As mentioned earlier,
such an infrastructure tool could be viewed as a database management
system that is specialised towards databases that record causality and
asynchrony. But the infrastructure tool would otherwise be rather gen-
eral in intent, and would we hope enable practical experiments related to
computer-aided support to people involved in complex criminal investi-
gations and safety enquiries, as well as to computer design activitie, such
as system verification via model checking, that rely on having a fully-
detailed model of the system.
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A Alternate occurrence nets
In what follows, we assume the notation introduced and explained in [22].
The only new concept is that of a set of alternative views (or worlds),
AV
df
= {A1, . . . ,Aℓ}.
Definition 1 (alt-occurrence net AON). An alternative occurrence net
is a tuple AON
df
= (C,E, F, ϑ) where C 6= ∅ and E are finite disjoint sets
of respectively conditions and events, F ⊆ (C ×E)∪ (E ×C) is a flow
relation, and ϑ : C ∪ E ∪ F → 2AV \ {∅} is a mapping, such that, for
every A ∈ AV :
AON  A
df
= (C  A, E  A, F  A)
is an occurrence net, where we define, for X = C,E, F , X  A to be
the set of all x ∈ X such that A ∈ ϑ(x).
Moreover, we assume that, for every A ∈ AV :
InitAON  A ⊆ {c ∈ C | ¬∃e ∈ E : (e, c) ∈ F}
FinAON  A ⊆ {c ∈ C | ¬∃e ∈ E : (c, e) ∈ F} . ⋄
The above definition incorporates the basic principles behind our
modelling of alternative histories of systems. In essence, what we want
to express is that a history with alternatives is an overlay of individual
sound histories, each such individual history being tagged by a symbol A
in AV as specified by the mapping ϑ. Crucially, what is allowed is that
the same element may be tagged by multiple tags, meaning that it is part
of many views. In an extreme case, when the element is tagged by all the
tags in AV , it becomes a ‘certain’ element which has been verified to ex-
ist by all the views represented in the alternative occurrence net.1 Hence
AON  A is the behavioural report of what has happened from the point
of view of one of the possible alternatives A ∈ AV . The two conditions
at the end of the definition mean that the views are not completely arbi-
trary and, in particular, a non-initial condition in one view should not be
an initial condition in another view.
1 Note that in the main part of this paper, e.g., in Figure 9, we simply left such ‘certain’ elements
un-tagged.
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Since we are now dealing with multiple accounts of a system’s evo-
lution, it is natural to define the initial and final situations as sets:
InitAON
df
= {InitAON  A1, . . . , InitAON  Aℓ}
FinAON
df
= {FinAON  A1 , . . . ,FinAON  Aℓ} .
In the same way, a cut of AON is any of the cuts of the occurrence nets
AON  Ai.
A step execution of the alt-occurrence net AON as in Definition 1 is
a sequence χ
df
= D0 G1 D1 . . . GnDn (n ≥ 0), where each Di is a set
of conditions and each Gi is a possibly empty set of events (called a
step), for which there is A ∈ AV such that χ is a step sequence of the
occurrence net AON  A. We also say that the step execution χ leads to
the cut Dn, and that Dn is reachable.
The following result can be seen as a validation of the soundness of
the notions just introduced.
Theorem 1. Given the step execution as above, we have that: eachDi is
a cut of AON; no event occurs more than once; andDn ∈ FinON iff each
event of one of the occurrence nets AON  A occurs in the execution.
Moreover, each cut of AON can be reached from one of the initial cuts
through some step execution, and there is a step execution involving all
the events in each occurrence net AON  A. ⋄
Basically, AON is sound in the sense of obeying some natural tempo-
ral properties as well as testifying to the fact that AON does not contain
redundant parts. We also have a complete characterisation of global states
reachable from the default initial states — these are all the cuts of AON.
In practical terms, the latter means that we can verify state properties of
the computations captured by AON by running a model checker which
inspects all the cuts.
B Alternate communication SONs
The AONs introduced in the previous section are based on occurrence
nets which are flat records of concurrent execution histories. In [22] we
proposed to structure such histories through different classes of struc-
tured occurrence nets, each such class being aimed at dealing with one of
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the complex relationships involved in dynamic evolutions. We will now
show how one can enhance the fundamental concept of communication
structured occurrence net with the notion of alternative execution.
Definition 2 (communication ASON). Let AONi
df
= (Ci, Ei, Fi, ϑi) for
i = 1, . . . , k be alternative occurrence nets (k ≥ 1) with disjoint sets of
nodes.
Let κ and σ be two relations (σ being symmetric) comprising pairs of
events coming from different AONi’s, and ϑ
′ : κ ∪ σ → 2AV \ {∅}.
An alternative communication structured occurrence net is a tuple
AC SON
df
= (ON1, . . . , ONk, κ, σ, ϑ1 ∪ . . . ϑk ∪ ϑ)
such that, for every A ∈ AV ,
AC SON  A
df
= (ON1  A, . . . , ONk  A, κ  A, σ  A)
is a communication structured occurrence net ⋄
Similarly as in the case of AONs, the definition takes a number of
CSONs and overlays them into a single structure. Again, this may result
in some of the elements becoming ‘certain’, and some only being parts
of a subset of potential views on the execution history represented by
ACSON.
For the ACSON as above, cuts and step executions need to be re-
defined, by taking into account the fact that there are multiple accounts
of a system’s evolution:
InitAC SON
df
= {InitAC SON  A1, . . . , InitAC SON  Aℓ}
FinAC SON
df
= {FinAC SON  A1 , . . . ,FinAC SON  Aℓ} .
In the same way, a cut of AC SON is any of the cuts of the occurrence
nets AC SON  Ai.
Proposition 1. If Cut is a cut of the AC SON, then there is A ∈ AV such
that Cut ∩ Ci is a cut of ONi  A, for every i ≤ k. ⋄
That is, projecting cuts of ACSON produces valid cuts of the component
AONs according to one of the possible views.
A step execution of AC SON is a sequence χ
df
= D0 G1 D1 . . . GnDn
(n ≥ 0), where each Di is a set of conditions and each Gi is a possibly
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empty set of events (called a step), for which is A ∈ AV such that χ is a
step sequence of the occurrence net AC SON  A. We also say that the
step execution χ leads to the cut Dn, and that Dn is reachable.
The following result extends the observation behind Proposition 1 to
step executions.
Theorem 2. Given the step execution as above, for every j ≤ k, there is
A ∈ AV such that the sequence
D0∩Cj G1∩Ej D1∩Cj . . . Gn∩Ej Dn∩Cj
is a step execution of the occurrence net ONj  A. ⋄
The final result is a re-statement of Theorem 1 formulated for AONs.
Theorem 3. Given a step execution as above, we have that: each Di is
a cut of AC SON; no event occurs more than once; and Dn = FinAC SON
iff each event of one of the occurrence nets AC SON  A occurs in the
execution. Moreover, each cut of AC SON can be reached from the initial
cut through some step execution, and there is a step execution involving
all the events in AC SON  A, for every A ∈ AV . ⋄
